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SUBSIDIZING ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
© 2012 Maxwell S. Bayman 
 
 After Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005,1 the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission experienced a flood of applicants seeking construction and operating licenses to build 
modern nuclear power plants.  The legislative purpose of the Act is to promote the development 
of cleaner forms of energy.  By the time the act became effective, it had been over thirty years 
since the last application was filed.  The Act provides, inter alia, a federal subsidy in the form of 
a production tax credit for “advanced nuclear facilities.”2  At first, it appeared the credit could be 
extremely valuable; however, built-in limitations and complex requirements reduced the value of 
the credit for each new applicant.  Unfortunately, the credit does not apply to applicants filing af-
ter 2008.  Since then, only one new application for a Construction and Operating License has 
been filed, and the industry’s interest in advanced nuclear energy continues to remain substan-
tially diminished.  For nuclear tax subsidies to be effective, they must have the power to reduce 
or remove the high-risk barriers precluding investment in modern nuclear power plants.  The leg-
islative goals of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 cannot be given effect if the subsidies it provides 
progressively decrease to a nominal value.   
The first part of this paper reviews the historical development of nuclear energy and 
compares nuclear energy to the other alternative sources of energy production.  Part II discusses 
the process of planning, building, and operating a nuclear facility and the tax consequences of 
each stage.  Part III reviews and critiques the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facili-
                                                 
1 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
2 Id. § 1306. 
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ties.  Finally, Part IV considers alternative tax-based solutions to promote nuclear energy through 
changes to corporate tax brackets and amendments to the credit system.   
I. Historical Development of Nuclear Energy; Alternative Sources of Production 
 
A.  Overview of Current Electricity Paradigm 
 
Innovations in modern technology occur every day, making electronic devices increas-
ingly accessible to the general public.  The effects of cell phones, laptop computers, televisions, 
and automated home electronics permeate all levels of our society.3 The modern technological 
age continues to expand the process of globalization, from connecting individuals a world apart, 
to improving healthcare in rural areas.  None of these advancements would be possible without 
electricity.   
For the fifteen-year period beginning from 1997 to 2012, electricity usage in the U.S. in-
creased 17.5%.4  The need for electricity will continue to grow as our population increases in 
size, and innovations in modern technology change the way we live our lives.  As demand for 
electricity increases, so too must our ability to generate power.  There are significant environ-
mental implications related to the method by which power companies meet new demands.  Mod-
ern power plants must reduce carbon emissions and decrease the energy industry’s adverse im-
pact on the environment.  This would entail a significant departure from our current energy ar-
rangement, which relies heavily on coal and natural gas.  The question becomes how to achieve 
                                                 
3 In extreme cases, countries have taken defensive military action based on inaccurate representations of borderlines 
on Google Maps. Jenny Schlesinger, Google Nearly Starts a War. Seriously, ABC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010, 12:43 
p.m.), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/11/google-nearly-starts-a-war-seriously/.  Users of Facebook, an 
online networking website, planned and effectuated the overthrow of a dictatorial government. Wilson Rothman, 
How the Internet Brought Down a Dictator, NBCNEWS.COM TECHNOLOGY, http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/ 
technolog/how-internet-brought-down-dictator-125222  (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  Even relationships end due to 
arguments between couples over the amount of time spent on the internet.  Jennifer Aniston Ended Relationship with 
John Mayer Because of His Twitter ‘Obsession’, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ technolo-
gy/twitter/5038203/Jennifer-Aniston-ended-relationship-with-John-Mayer-because-of-his-Twitter-obsession.html 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
4 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW tbl. 7.2a, at 95 (Dec. 2012) (Electricity Net Generation: 
Total (All Sectors)), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_5.pdf.    
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these environmental goals, while meeting the production level requisite to satisfy growing de-
mand.  Yet, the industry is slow to respond to environmentally friendly alternatives.  A market 
for cleaner alternative sources will emerge when the demand for electricity exceeds our national 
generating capacity, and proper federal subsidies are in place.  Under those circumstances, nu-
clear power may become the new leader in production for modern electricity. 5   
 Nuclear power is a safe, clean, and efficient form of energy.6  It is capable of satisfying 
the increasing demand for electricity as well as significantly reducing carbon emissions com-
pared to coal and natural gas powered facilities.7  Today, there are 104 nuclear reactors “operat-
ing in the U.S., [which] are among . . . [the] safest . . . industrial facilities” in the nation.8  The 
carbon footprint of nuclear power is comparable to that of renewable generation sources.9  The 
operating life of a nuclear power plant is around forty years.  In some cases, new operating li-
censes allow existing plants to extend their operating life by another twenty years.10  Additional-
ly, the average nuclear power plant has the ability to operate at 90% of its deemed “nameplate 
capacity.”11   
Unfortunately, many barriers prevent investors from pursuing modern nuclear develop-
ment.  The cost of preparing and filing an application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
                                                 
5 But cf. Denis Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New Technology, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 11, 40 (1990) (“There has 
always been a substantial body of opposition to nuclear power.”). 
6 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 821, 883 (2010) (noting that nuclear energy plants produce no conventional air pollutants or emissions).   
7 See Katarina O. Savino, The Case for Nuclear Power Tax Incentives, 123 TAX NOTES 329 (2009), available at 
2009 TNT 74-8 (LEXIS).   
8, Financial Stimulus to Nuclear Energy Industry Will Promote Job Creation, Industry Official Testifies, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (Nov. 10, 2009), available at 2009 TNT 216-38 (LEXIS) (testimony of Carol L. Berrigan to the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee). None of these facilities are eligible for the production tax credit created by the EPA-2005, 
since all were placed in service before 1993.  
9 Id.  
10 Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 231 (2005). 
11 Gary L. Hunt & George Given, America's Resource Mix, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 9-10 (July 2006), 
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2006/07/americas-resource-mix/page/0/1 (discussing historic output for nu-
clear power plants in the early 2000s).  “The ‘nameplate capacity‘ of a reactor is its maximum rated output, which 
may be expressed in GW per hour, and is usually indicated on a nameplate physically attached to the reactor.” Alan 
S. Lederman, How Powerful Is the Nuclear Reactor Income Tax Credit?, 114 J. TAX. 100 (2011).   
 
3 
(NRC) for a Construction and Operating License (COL) is expensive and time-consuming.  
Where the application for a COL is successful, investors will then face the daunting task of 
building the facility.  Although unexpected costs incurred during the construction phase of nu-
clear facilities are expected to decrease as reactor designs are streamlined,12 the facility’s con-
struction may be riddled with unexpected costs, design failures, lengthy inspections, and eco-
nomic downturn that may result in the loss of financing.13  Without congressional policies that 
control or reduce the significant investment risks associated with the construction of modern nu-
clear power plants, development will continue at a turtle’s pace.14  Thus, the nuclear industry is 
not likely to expand without significant federal support.15   
B.  History and Development of Nuclear Energy 
1. Historical Overview 
 The history of atomic energy dates back to World War II and the Manhattan Project.16  
After World War II, the future of atomic power was somewhat uncertain.  Some scientists saw a 
new opportunity to use atomic power as a commercial energy source.17  However, the Atomic 
Energy Act of 194618 prohibited private development of atomic energy.19  The Act’s prohibition 
                                                 
12 Robert Zuppert, Nuclear Power Standardization, STRATEGIC STANDARDS EDUC., 11, http://www. strategicstand-
ards.com/files/NuclearEnergy.pdf(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
13 Duke Raises Cost Estimate for Lee Plant, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NN-Duke_raises_cost_estimate_for_Lee_plant-0711084.html  (reporting that Duke Energy incurred $70 
million in pre-construction costs in 2007 and estimating an additional $160 million in pre-construction costs for the 
two-year period beginning in 2008). 
14 Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, 28 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 363, 364 (1987).   
15 The U.S. government began taking steps to reduce the financial and administrative burdens that preclude or inhibit 
nuclear power plant development.  Some help came with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.  The Act confirmed Congress’ plan to provide the needed support 
to encourage the revitalization of nuclear energy. 
16 Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy 
Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394-95 (1976).   
17 See Sonny Swazo, Casenote, The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and the Tenth 
Amendment: Nevada v. Watkins, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 127, 129 (1996) (“To better serve the national interest, 
Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 to further private sector nuclear energy development for 
peaceful purposes . . . .” 
18 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755. 
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on private development stemmed from well-founded apprehensions related to the perceived de-
structive power of radioactive materials and the fear that commercial development could affect 
the environment as well as public health.20  Within a few years, the industry’s successful lobby-
ing efforts led to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.21  The Act enabled the private 
sector to invest in and develop commercial uses for atomic energy.22   
2. Commercialization of Atomic Energy 
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided the federal support needed to facilitate the pri-
vate development of commercial nuclear power.23  However, the liabilities associated with pri-
vate development were too risky for the industry to bear without government support; investors 
were understandably reluctant to “proceed with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over [their] 
head[s].”24  In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957.25  
The Act largely limited the liability of utility providers upon the occurrence of a major acci-
dent.26  As a result, entrepreneurs and major utility companies began the widespread construction 
of commercialized nuclear power plants from 1957 through the mid-1960s.27  This period was 
known as the “Great Band Wagon Market” for nuclear energy.28   
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Tomain, supra note 10, at 227. 
20 Allen R. Ferguson, Jr., Comment, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear Regulation: 
Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 899-900 (1984). 
21 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919. 
22 Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 508 (1981); see also Tomain, supra note 10, at 227 (stating that the 1954 Act is the backdrop for our cur-
rent regulatory scheme). 
23 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 194 (1983). 
24 See Tomain, supra note 10, at 228 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER: HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE, CURRENT STATUES, AND OUTLOOK 6 (DOE/EIA-0315, Mar. 1982). 
25 Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576. 
26 Diane Carter Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 
597, 602 (1982). 




Despite an initially promising inception, the Great Band Wagon Market slowed and even-
tually froze by the mid-1970s.29  From 1978 to 2008, no new Construction and Operating Li-
censes (COLs) were approved.30  Reasons for the thirty-year lull in development include: (1) un-
expected and excessive capital costs in designing, building, and operating nuclear facilities;31  
(2) public safety concerns soaring after the partial-meltdown of Pennsylvania’s Three-Mile Is-
land plant in March of 1979 and the disastrous meltdown of Chernobyl in the former Soviet Un-
ion in April of 198632; and (3) innovative development of competing sources of energy such as 
natural gas and renewable sources.  
 In 2005, the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPA-2005) revived interest in nuclear en-
ergy, and ushered in what some have dubbed the “Nuclear Renaissance.”33  The EPA-2005 pro-
vides incentives for the development of advanced nuclear power plants such as production tax 
credits, "a loan guarantee program, and regulatory risk insurance.”34  By the end of 2008, sixteen 
new applications—proposing twenty-four nuclear reactors—were filed with the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission.35  Unfortunately, the EPA-2005 only sparked interest in advanced nuclear 
power for a short period of time.36   
                                                 
29 See Maleson, supra note 26, at 618 (noting the rapid rate of applications and construction for new nuclear facili-
ties, followed by a sudden marked decline in the 1970s). 
30 The last construction permit for a nuclear power plant was issued in 1978 and the last operating license was issued 
in 1996.  On February 9, 2012, the NRC approved its first COL in thirty years.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Approves Construction of First Nuclear Units in 30 Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 5, 
2012),  http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5250. 
31 See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of Cheap Electricity, 12 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 407, 409 (2010) (noting that construction costs for nuclear reactors skyrocketed in the 1970s). 
32 See T.L. Fahring, Note, Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of A U.S. Nuclear Renaissance, 41 TEX. 
ENVTL. L.J. 279, 288 (2011) (“Actual nuclear accidents in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly those at Browns Ferry, 
Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl, did little to reassure the public.”) 
33 Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current "Nuclear Renaissance" in the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Po-
tential Pitfalls, 29 Energy L.J. 279, 281 (2008). 
34 Sony Ben-Moshe et al., Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of Federal & 
State Government Subsidies and the Future of Nuclear Power in California, 30 ENERGY L.J. 497, 514 (2009). 
35 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications], available at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-
licensing-files/expected-new-rx-applications.pdf. 






3. How Nuclear Power Works 
The commercial generation of electricity is largely based on Michael Faraday’s principle 
of electromagnetic induction.37  Electromagnetic induction converts mechanical energy into elec-
tricity by using an external force to rotate a conductor, such as copper wire, in a magnetic field.38  
Modern generators accomplish the same task but on a much larger scale.  In lieu of Faraday’s 
hand-crank, most modern generators consist of a turbine connected to a large magnet surrounded 
by coiled wires.39  For decades, scientists continued to develop different ways to produce the 
mechanical energy needed to continuously rotate these turbines.  Coal, natural gas, atomic ener-
gy, petroleum, solar, and hydro-power are among the methods in use today.40   
Atomic energy harnesses the immense power of nuclear fission to create heat.41  The heat 
generated from a nuclear reactor is used to produce steam from water.  The steam then provides 
the mechanical energy needed to rotate the turbine of a generator.  The fission process originates 
in the core of the nuclear reactor, where rods containing uranium pellets interact with neutrons 
that force the uranium atoms to split, resulting in a significant release of energy in the form of 
                                                 
37 Joshua J. Houser, Note, Supplying the Light at the End of the Tunnel: Using State-Level Experience to Develop 
Federal-Level Renewable Energy Policy, 19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 153, 157 (2010).   
38 Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 885 (2011). 
39 See Houser, supra note 37 (explaining how modern commercial generators work). 
40 William K. Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 
73 COLUM. L. REV. 462, 520-25 (1973).   
41 See Marshall Brain & Robert Lamb, How Nuclear Power Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://science.howstuff 
works.com/nuclear-power2.htm(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
 
7 
heat.42 “To prevent overheating, control rods” may be inserted into the core, to regulate the rate 
of the reaction.43   
“In some nuclear power plants,” a secondary water system carries out the remainder of 
the process.44  The first system circulates water around the core of the reactor, where the water 
converts to steam, reaching a temperature of 550 degrees Fahrenheit.45  The steam generator con-
tains a separate enclosed water-system.46  The water from the core heats up the water in the gen-
erator, converting it to steam.47  The steam passes through a system of pipes and collides with 
the blades of the turbine, forcing it to rotate.  A shaft connects the turbine to the generator, con-
verting the mechanical force of the turbine’s rotation into an electrical current.  Cooling water, 
supplied from nearby lakes or other natural sources, condenses the steam back to water.   
4. U.S. Nuclear Amperage 
The United States is home to 104 nuclear reactors.48  Based off of production capacity, 
nuclear power accounts for 10% of the total nameplate capacity of U.S. based power genera-
tors.49  Those 104 reactors historically average 90% net utilization of their nameplate capacity, 
                                                 
42 See N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1998) (outlining a brief description of the 
nuclear fission process). Uranium is a naturally occurring element and must be mined from the ground and enriched 
through a series of refining processes.  The enrichment phase increases the concentration of U235 isotope needed to 
maintain the reaction. Id. The fission reaction begins when a neutron enters the nucleus of an U235 atom forcing it 
to split into smaller nuclei and release more neutrons, causing a chain reaction. See Brain & Lamb, supra note 41.. 
43 Brain & Lamb, supra note 41.   
44 Id.  
45 Ben Casselman & Rebecca Smith, How Nuclear Reactors Work . . . And the Dangers When They Don’t, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704893604576200982857244 782.html.   
46 See Brain & Lamb, supra note 41.   
47 Id.  
48 See Resources and Stats:  U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/resourcesand 
stats/nuclear_statistics/usnuclearpowerplants/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). One megawatt is equivalent to 1000 kilo-
watts or one million watts of electricity. See Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=M (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (defining “megawatt” as one million watts of electricity 
or one-thousand kilowatts). 




making them much more efficient and reliable than competing sources.50  Although nuclear en-
ergy commands only 10% of the nation’s nameplate capacity, it accounts for 20% of electricity 
actually produced.  Comparatively, coal-powered facilities and natural gas powered plants ac-
count for 30% and 41%, respectively, of the overall nameplate capacity.51  However, these statis-
tics are based on production capability, not actual output.52  According to the data for actual out-
put, coal is the largest producer, accounting for 45% of total production.53  Natural gas comes in 
second at 23% of total production.54  The ability to operate at 90% of its nameplate capacity, 
well above competing sources, makes nuclear power a reliable source of carbon-free energy pro-
duction.   
C.  Competing Sources  
1. Natural Gas and Conventional Coal 
 Many factors affect the development of alternate sources of energy in the United States.  
The economics of energy production are but one important consideration.  Recent developments 
in innovative drilling techniques for natural gas caused its market price to drop considerably, 
thereby making it a competitive source for energy. 55  Price fluctuations due to seasonal demand 
contribute some uncertainty to natural gas' economic competiveness, as compared to other 
                                                 
50 Compare Resources and Stats:  U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 48 (nuclear facilities operate around 90%) 
with Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49 (natural gas production capability at 30% and coal produc-
tion capability at 41%).   
51 Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49.   
52 See Jennifer W. Fletcher et al., Constructing Power: The Near Term Outlook for Construction of Power Genera-
tion Projects in the 21st Century, J. AM C. CONSTRUCTION LAW., July 2011, at 4 (vol. 5, no. 2) (using net output sta-
tistics). 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the 
Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 118 (2009) (stating that innovations in horizontal and 
hydraulic fracturing and drilling techniques enabled natural gas developers to drastically increase their production 
capabilities); Fletcher et al., supra note 52.   
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sources.56  Conventional coal remains the most economically inexpensive source of electricity 
production in the U.S.57  However, the output rates for coal and natural gas are substantially 
lower than that of nuclear power.  In 2010, production from natural gas and coal reflected 34% 
and 64%, respectively, of their overall nameplate capacities.58  
Given these disparities, the environmental consequences of energy production should al-
so be taken into account when deciding which course to pursue.  The price advantages of natural 
gas and conventional coal over nuclear energy dissipate after taking into account their harmful 
impact to the environment; as one commentator noted, “The true cost of coal is not expressed in 
its market price or the levelized cost of generation.  Coal destroys the environment and harms 
public health at every stage of production.”59  The same can be said for natural gas, though it 
does produce 60% less carbon emissions than conventional coal.60  
2. Wind and Solar Energy 
In 2010, wind and photovoltaic sources of energy accounted for only 2.9% of electricity 
produced, due to a lack of productivity.61  Wind energy operates at only 27% of its nameplate 
capacity and solar energy averages only 14% of its nameplate capacity.62  Although wind and so-
lar produce a fraction of their nameplate capacities, they continue to receive significant federal 
                                                 
56 See John Shelton, Comment, Who, What, How, & Wind: The Texas Energy Market's Future Relationship with 
Wind Energy and Whether It Will Be Enough to Meet the State's Needs, 11 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 401, 405 (2010) 
(discussing fluctuations in natural gas prices in Texas). 
57 Seth P. Cox, The Nuclear Option: Promotion of Advanced Nuclear Generation as a Matter of Public Policy, 5 
APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 25, 30 (2011). 
58 Resources and Stats:  U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 48 (combining variables from Energy Information 
Administration data).  Formula: Step One: (aggregate nameplate capacity for specific source) x (24 hours/day) x 
(365 days/year) = Estimated yearly output for nameplate capacity.  Step Two: (Actual output for given year) / (Esti-
mated yearly output) = True Production Capability. 
59 Cox, supra note 57, at 31. 
60 Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 621, 627 (2007).   
61 Table 1.1.A. Net Generation by Other Renewables:  Total (All Sectors, 2002-October 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN.:  ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher. 
cfm?t=epmt_1_1_a [hereinafter Net Generation by Other Renewables]. 
62 Wind turbines combined for a total nameplate capacity of 39,516 megawatts, yet operated at only 27% of that 
amount. Similarly, solar (photovoltaic) energy totaled 8646 megawatts of nameplate capacity but produced only 
14% of that amount.  Combine variables from EIA data.  See Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49; 
see also Net Generation by Other Renewables, supra note 61.   
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subsidies.63  As a result, wind and solar energy have significantly expanded over the past twenty 
years.64  Renewable sources no longer stand as negligible alternatives to conventional methods 
of producing electricity, though they are far from capable of handling current and future elec-
tricity demands.65  In addition, there are ecological concerns that befuddle renewable energy de-
velopment.66 These environmental setbacks present a challenging obstacle but by no means indi-
cate that renewable energy is an incompatible solution to the growing demand for electricity.  
Until production capabilities in renewable energy significantly improve, we must choose to de-
velop new coal, natural gas, or nuclear plants to meet the growing demand for electricity.   
 The revitalization of nuclear energy as an alternative energy source is the best solution to 
our future electricity needs, because of its ability to increase the national production capacity and 
                                                 
63 See Fletcher et al., supra note 52 (stating that wind receives $23.37 in federal subsidies and support and solar re-
ceives $24.34 per megawatt-hour). 
64 Solar-power production increased 340% from a net yearly output of 357 GWh in 1990 to 1212 GWh in 2010.  
Likewise, wind energy increased by 3393%  in actual output from 2789 GWh in 1990 to 94,652 GWh in 2010.  See 
Net Generation by Other Renewables, supra note 61.   
65 Some proponents of renewable alternatives believe sustainable production lies in the near future. See Christoph H. 
Stefes, The German Solution: Feed-in Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011),http://www.nytimes. 
com/roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/us-should-emulate-germanys-
renewable-energy-model. But the twenty-five-year outlook for renewable energy may not be so optimistic.  The 
long-term outlook supports the proposition that renewable alternatives will improve overall but continue to fall short 
of supplanting conventional methods such as coal, natural gas, or nuclear energy.  See generally Fletcher et al., su-
pra note 52. The International Energy Agency in its 2010 Annual World Energy Outlook, reported that the global 
electricity demand will increase 2.5% per year, making it the world’s fastest growing energy source. Charles K. 
Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Geopolitics of Electricity, GLOBAL POST (Jan. 25, 2010, 08:23),http:// 
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/100114/electricity-developing-world.  Also, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration anticipates that renewable resource production capacity will increase from 13% in 2011 to 16% in 
2040. Today in Energy: EIA Projections Show U.S. Energy Production Growing Faster Than Consumption Through 
2040, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9070.  However, 
the Energy Information Administration report on peak loads from all grids shows an average of 1.28% increase in 
demand over an eleven-year period from 1999 to 2010.  Electric Power Annual 2010 Data Table 4.1.A, U.S. ENER-
GY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/table4.1a.cfm.  Although renewable en-
ergy will continue to thrive as sources of energy, they are incapable of replacing natural gas or coal methods of pro-
duction anytime in the near future.   
66 Wind and solar projects generally require much more land in order to generate electricity compared to that of oth-
er conventional sources.  Wind turbines create turbulence that may “significantly reduce the efficiency of a wind-
farm” and adversely affect the growth of nearby crops, causing “the land surface to become much warmer and dri-
er.” Answers to Huge Wind-Farm Problems Are Blowin' in the Wind, SCIENCE DAILY (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com-/releases/2008/12/081216104307.htm. Likewise, the best geographic locations for 
commercialized solar-powered cells are deserts and large open fields that may have sensitive and vibrant species of 
plants and animals. Fletcher et al., supra note 52. It may be necessary to clear large sections of vegetation to maxim-




simultaneously reduce carbon emissions.  However, the burden of bearing the investment risks in 
nuclear energy cannot rest solely on the shoulders of the private sector.67  Expansion will not oc-
cur without effective government policies that reduce the financial risks of building and operat-
ing a nuclear power plant.   
II. The Current Tax Regime 
A. Tax Consequences for Nuclear Power Plants 
 Tax subsidies promote economic development and encourage certain actions of existing 
taxpayers.  Subsidies frequently facilitate the creation of new businesses and the expansion of 
existing businesses.68  The same is true for commercial utility services.  In order to better under-
stand the long-term value of a tax-subsidy, it is important to analyze general tax consequences 
for corporate utilities.  Without beneficial tax subsidies, a modern nuclear facility will be too 
costly to build.69  The lack of investment in nuclear power detrimentally affects our government 
and society in four ways: (1) the government loses the long-term potential tax revenues; (2) 
Americans go without the much needed employment opportunity; (3) less overall electricity is 
produced from carbon-free energy; and (4) the environment suffers the continued detrimental 
impacts of coal and natural gas production of electricity.  In Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company v. Commissioner, the court noted that, “without such instigation by governmental bod-
ies and absent any governmental subsidies it would appear highly unlikely, especially during 
some of the financially troubled periods here involved, that these facilities would have been con-
structed.”70  Therefore, a tax subsidy is tantamount to an investment, and the government must 
                                                 
67 See Tomain, supra note 10, at 228. 
68 See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 75 T.C. 497, 761 (1980) supplemented, 82 T.C. 122 
(1984).  See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 
977 (1998).   
69 See Savino, supra note 7, at n.28. 
70 S. Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 761. 
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carefully provide, allocate, and limit those subsidies so as to achieve the goal of economic ex-
pansion while increasing long-term tax revenues.   To better understand why a tax-subsidy for 
nuclear power plants would be effective, this section focuses on the tax consequences associated 
with planning, building, and operating a hypothetical nuclear facility.71   
1. Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant 
 Every investor must determine the risks associated with pursuing a particular investment, 
and then weigh those risks against the likelihood that the investment will return income in excess 
of costs.  In terms of planning the construction of a nuclear power plant, investors must first ask 
how much debt they need to incur to build a plant, how long it will take before operations com-
mence, and how much it will cost to stay in business.  This determination can be illustrated by 
analyzing the tax consequences of a hypothetical nuclear power plant.72   
 Assume these basic facts for a simplified hypothetical nuclear power plant:  On July 31, 
2006, investors purchased a plot of land encompassing 1550 acres for $30 million, to be the fu-
ture site of an advanced power plant, named “Nuclear.”  On July 31, 2008, Nuclear’s investors 
filed an application for a COL with the NRC for a new Westinghouse AP1000 reactor capable of 
outputting at least 1000 megawatts of electricity.73  The NRC approved the application on Feb-
                                                 
71 The numbers, costs, and time-frames provided in the example are estimates based on public information.  They 
are intended to be as close to reality and as accurate as they can be. However, cost-overruns are unpredictable, infla-
tion will affect the values on long-term estimations, and the tax code may change.  See Chris Dubay, Taxmageddon: 
Massive Tax Increases Coming in 2013, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2012/04/taxmageddon-massive-tax-increase-coming-in-2013.  
72 Unfortunately, the cost of building a nuclear reactor is difficult to estimate due to unpredictable cost-overruns, 
construction scheduling delays, and financing issues. 
73 The Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design is capable of outputting an average of at least 1000 megawatts of elec-
tricity.  The AP1000 has many improvements compared to previous reactor designs, including passive safety mech-
anisms which utilize gravity, natural circulation, and condensation and evaporation.  The AP1000 reactor was de-
signed to operate for sixty years ensuring a 50% longer economic life from previous designs.  See generally U.S. 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RELATED TO CERTIFICATION OF THE AP1000 
STANDARD DESIGN at 4-24 (NUREG-1793, Supp. 2), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1120/ 
ML112061231.pdf  (discussing the design, output, and safety features of the Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear reactor).   
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ruary 12, 2012.  By January 1, 2013, construction of the facility began. At the peak of construc-
tion, Nuclear employed more than 2000 workers.74   
The total cost of construction will be $8 billion, of which 65% is attributable to construc-
tion costs and the remainder is attributable to financing costs.75  The capital costs include acqui-
sitions such as nuclear fuel rods, the construction of an on-site spent nuclear fuel storage facility, 
plant operations buildings, construction of a cooling lake, the reactor and containment building 
and all associated transmission equipment, equipment necessary to transfer coolant to the plant, 
an administration building ($30 million), and various parking lots and roads ($40 million).  As-
sume the average loan repayment period from all forms of debt-related financing over the life of 
the project is fifteen years, with an average interest rate of 6% per annum.   
The facility will commence operations by July 31, 2020, with a nameplate capacity of 
1000 megawatts and operate at an average of 93% of its capacity.  At least 400 permanent em-
ployees will be required to safely operate Nuclear throughout the year.76  Nuclear will charge an 
average of 14.37 cents/kWh to its customers.  At the end of Nuclear’s economic life, the de-
commissioning expenses will total $525 million, about 10% of the capital cost to build the plant.   
2. Levelized Cost of Energy for Hypothetical Plant 
 In order to determine whether Nuclear will be a profitable facility, its projected revenues 
must exceed its projected costs.  The Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) is a formula used to es-
                                                 
74 Southern Company projects that “at the peak of construction” of Plant Vogtle Units 3 and 4, “more than 3,500 
workers will be needed.”  JOBS AT PLANT VOGTLE (n.d.) (Southern Co. promotional brochure), available at 
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/pdf/Vogtle_Jobs_Brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).   
75 Southern Company’s Plant Vogtle two nuclear reactors are projected to cost around $14 billion dollars and pro-
vide around 2200 megawatts of electricity. Steve Hargreaves, First New Reactors OK’d in Over 30 Years, CNN 
MONEY (Feb. 9, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/news/economy/nuclear_reactors/index.htm.  Although the 
costs of building the plants are exceptionally high, Southern Co. secured a federal loan guarantee of $8.3 billion.  Id. 
Thus Georgia Power—one of the utility companies forming the consortium building Plant Vogtle—is liable for 
around $6 billion of the cost of building the two reactors of which 75% are construction costs and the remainder fi-
nancing costs.  Kristi E. Swartz, Vogtle Construction Cost Rise; Project Remains Under Budget, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/business/vogtle-construction-costs-rise-1236442.html. 
76 Southern Company will employ “more than 800 permanent employees to operate” Units 3 and 4 at its Plant 
Vogtle site. See JOBS AT PLANT VOGTLE, supra note 74. 
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timate the projected costs of the nuclear facility on a kilowatt-hour basis.  The LCOE estimates 
the economic competitiveness of various alternative fuel sources by reducing numerous cost-
variables into a single value, the price per kWh that would be required to recover all the costs as-
sociated with each plant over its economic life.77  The LCOE reflects the average minimum price 
at which a utility would need to sell its electricity, in order to recover the costs of planning, con-
structing, and operating the plant.78  Unfortunately, historic cost overruns during the construction 
phase of nuclear power plants have led investors to doubt that advanced nuclear facilities will 
achieve a competitive price-point in the consumer market.79  Nuclear facilities completed in the 
1980s and 1990s showed that actual costs were significantly higher than anticipated, and con-
struction took much longer to complete due to long and unforeseen delays.80  The Nuclear Ener-
gy Institute estimates the cost of modern nuclear reactors to be as high as $8 billion.81  Because 
the costs of building and operating a modern plant are uncertain, the LCOE should not be exclu-
sively relied upon in determining the point at which cost overruns will limit or preclude a feasi-
ble return in a competitive market.82  Even though the regulatory and political environments ac-
commodate the inception of modern nuclear power plants, investors must be certain that pursu-
                                                 
77 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2011 
(n.d.), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/2016levelized_costs_aeo2011.pdf.   
78 The LCOE takes into account overnight capital cost, fuel cost, fixed and variable operating and maintenance 
costs, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each source of energy. See generally Marcial T. Ocampo, 
How to Calculate the Levelized Cost of Energy – A Simplified Approach, ENERGY TECH. EXPERT (Apr. 28, 2009), 
http://energytechnologyexpert.com/cost-of-power-generation/how-to-calculate-the-levelized-cost-of-power-or-
energy/. The purpose of the formula used to derive the LCOE for energy resources was to simplify the process in as-
sessing the competitive risk for investors.  Beware—this “simplified” approach utilizes a complicated formula.  Id.  
79 See JOHN M DEUTCH ET AL., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 8 (MIT Energy Initiative 
2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf. 
80 Id.   
81 Nuclear Energy Institute Summarizes Nuclear Energy Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 21, 2009, at n.3, 2009 
TNT 206-40 (LEXIS). 
82 One possible reason for uncertainty in “overnight costs” is lack of data.  Almost sixteen years have passed since 
the most recent nuclear reactor commenced operations—the Watts Bar 1 in Tennessee began operations in 1996. See 
Frequently Asked Questions: How Old Are U.S. Nuclear Power Plants and When Was the Last One Built?, U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://205.254.135.7/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=228&t=21 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  Likewise, 
the last submitted application for a COL was over thirty years ago. See Frye, supra note 33, at 283. 
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ing the extraordinary expense associated with building a new reactor will be a profitable enter-
prise.83   
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology initiated a study to help understand the finan-
cial implications of building a modern nuclear power plant.  Its researchers estimated the LCOE 
for nuclear energy in 2002.  Based on an 85% net utilization rate and a forty-year economic life, 
the study projected the LCOE for nuclear power at 6.7 cents/kWh compared to coal at 4.2 
cents/kWh and natural gas at 3.8 cents/kWh.84  Researchers updated their findings in 2007, when 
construction costs of nuclear facilities were expected to double previous estimates.  The new 
LCOE values yielded 8.4 cent/kWh for nuclear, 6.2 cents/kWh for coal, and 6.5 cents/kWh for 
natural gas.85  The study further noted that nuclear power would become competitive if a carbon 
tax was imposed on coal and natural gas powered plants.86   
With respect to Nuclear, the financing period and capital costs will be important factors 
in determining the minimum cost of energy.87  Nuclear’s reactor will require around seventy-five 
tonnes of low-enriched uranium to operate its core.88  In March of 2011, the total estimated cost 
                                                 
83 The LCOE analysis will benefit these investors by providing the required cost per/kWh of energy in a certain year 
necessary to cover the costs of building and operating a nuclear facility over an assumed economic life. 
84 STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 7 (MIT Energy Initiative, 2003), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-full.pdf. 
85 DEUTCH ET AL., supra note 79, at 6 tbl. 1.   
86 Id. at 7.   
87 For Nuclear’s first year of operations, it must pay $531,629,802 in debt repayment expenses of which 
$308,942,267 is attributable to interest payments and $222,687,535 is attributable to principal. Computed using a 
loan repayment calculator.  Principal = $5.25 billion. Interest = 6%/year.  Repayment Period = 15 years. In addition, 
refueling costs must be taken into account. A typical reactor will operate the nuclear core by utilizing a cycling 
method for its nuclear fuel.  See The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/education/nfc.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (noting that a 1000 megawatt reactor will require approx-
imately 75 tonnes of low enriched uranium). About every ten to sixteen months, one-third of the fuel rods need to be 
replaced.  See N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1998). 
88 One “tonne” is a metric ton, equal to 1000 kilograms or 2,204.62 lbs.  Our hypothetical nuclear power plant would 
require approximately 75,000 kilograms or 165,346.5 lbs. of low-enriched uranium to operate.  See The Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle, supra note 87 (noting that a 1,000 megawatt reactor will require approximately 75 tonnes of low en-
riched uranium).   
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of a nuclear fuel rod was $2,770 per kilogram.89  Approximately $208 million of Nuclear's capi-
tal costs come from the expense of nuclear fuel rods.  Furthermore, Nuclear’s first refueling cy-
cle will total approximately $69,250,000 or an average of 0.85 cents/kWh each year.90  The aver-
age cost in terms of kilowatt hours for these expenses will be approximately 7.37 cents/kWh.  
Based on these variables, an LCOE of 8.4 cents/kWh might be an appropriate estimate.  To be 
conservative, assume Nuclear incurs costs of 10 cents/kWh to produce electricity throughout the 
year.  With these background facts in mind, it is possible to understand the tax treatment of Nu-
clear’s operations.   
3. Gross Revenue 
It is necessary to compute Nuclear’s gross revenues for its first year of operations to un-
derstand the extent of any deductions that may affect its tax liability.  Given that Nuclear has a 
nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts, operates at 93% of its nameplate capacity, and charges 
its customers 14.37 cents/kWh for electricity, Nuclear’s gross revenues will total over $1.17 bil-
lion by the end of its first year of operations.91 
B.  Expenses, Capital Expenditures, and Depreciation 
 Most expenses associated with the production of income may be deducted, relieving the 
taxpayer of liability for amounts equivalent to the reimbursement value.92  Because the govern-
ment taxes net income, gain, and profits, deductions from gross income ultimately decrease an 
                                                 
89 See The Economics of Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.html (last up-
dated Dec. 2012).   
90 Computed as follows: ($2,770 average cost/kg of fuel rod) x (75,0000 kg) / [(1,000 megawatts) x (1,000 kilo-
watts) x (24 hours) x (365 days) x (93% operating capacity)] = 0.85 cents/kWh.  In 2011, the average cost of refuel-
ing a reactor was around $40 million for each cycle (one-third of the core) or 0.68 cents/kWh of electricity pro-
duced.  See Resources and Stats: Costs: Fuel, Operation and Waste Disposal, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/costs/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).   
91 Computed as follows: (1,000 megawatt nameplate capacity) x (1,000 kilowatts/megawatt) x (24 hours/day) x (365 
days/year) x (93% output average) x (14.37 cents/kWh produced and sold) =  $1,170,695,160.   
92 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2012).   
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entity’s taxable income resulting in less tax paid to the government.93  Yet, deductions are more 
than just a legislative grace, as compared to tax credits or direct federal subsidies.94  While tax 
credits and direct federal subsidies are limited in scope and duration, deductions are permitted 
routinely for every qualifying year, allowing for an equitable adjustment to the taxpayer’s in-
come and preventing unnecessary taxation of expenditures related to routine economic activity.95  
1. Start-up Expenditures 
 The formation of a business usually requires investors to expend start-up expenditures, 
such as the costs of incorporating a business or training employees before business operations 
commence.  Under § 195 of the Code, these amounts may be deducted from income.96 For a 
large company, start-up expenditures must be capitalized—not deducted entirely from gross re-
ceipts—and taken as a ratable deduction for the fifteen-year period beginning from the month in 
which the active trade or business begins.97 The practical effect of § 195 is that no deductions 
will be taken until the nuclear power plant commences operations by producing electricity.   
Modern nuclear facilities that incur large costs during the start-up phase suffer from the 
capitalization requirement for two reasons.  First, because the ratable deduction must be taken 
over a fifteen-year period, they suffer the detrimental loss in the time-value of money as com-
                                                 
93 A reduction in gross receipts will lead to an overall reduction of tax liability. 
94 But cf. INDOPCO, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 U.S. 79, 80 (1992) (noting that deductions are grants of legislative grace). 
95 See generally 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-199 (West 2012) (code provisions pertaining to itemized deductions for indi-
viduals and corporations). 
96 26 U.S.C.A. § 195(b)(1) (West 2012).  
97 26 U.S.C.A. § 195(b)(1)(B) (West 2012).  The deduction, however, is not to exceed $10,000 and begins to phase 
out once start-up expenditures exceed $70,000—reducing the deduction to $0.  Id.§ 195(b)(3).  The policy support-
ing § 195 is similar to the Court’s holding in INDOPCO, Inc. v. C.I.R. that expenditures incurred in the successful 
creation of a new business are non-deductible capital expenditures.  See Costs of Starting a New Business, 34 AM. 
JUR. 2D Federal Taxation ¶ 16291; see also INDOPCO, Inc., 503 U.S. at 90 (holding that expenses incurred in a 
friendly takeover do not qualify as ordinary and necessary under § 162 of the Code). Hence the puny $10,000 deduc-
tion and the residual 15-year capitalization period. More fundamentally, start-up expenditures mirror those of busi-
ness-expense deductions, which cannot be taken until the enterprise is up and running. 
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pared to a shorter period of capitalization.98  Second, the deduction is ratable in a manner akin to 
straight-line depreciation, rather than double-declining or 150%-declining methods under normal 
ACRS rules.99  Straight-line depreciation may be computed by taking the total value of the capi-
tal expense and dividing by the number of years to be depreciated.  For start-up expenditures, the 
taxpayer will take a deduction from income in the amount of one-fifteenth of the total cost of 
starting the business, as the capitalization period is fifteen years.  Normally for property purchas-
es that have a class life of fifteen years, the taxpayer may take advantage of accelerated deprecia-
tion deductions under § 168, using the “150 percent declining balance method,” to yield a larger 
deduction.  For Nuclear, the start-up expenditures incurred would result from employee training 
costs and salaries prior to commencing operations.  If the average training cost per employee for 
a one-year period is $10,000 and the average salary per employee is $55,000, then start-up ex-
penditures will constitute approximately $26 million.  Assuming other miscellaneous start-up 
expenditures total $10 million, the aggregate start-up expenditures amount to $36 million.  Based 
on this figure, the yearly deduction for Nuclear’s start-up expenditures would be $2.4 million 
dollars for the first fifteen years.100 
2. Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses 
Current operating expenses are deducted under § 162 of the Code. However, the acquisi-
tion costs of any asset with a useful life of more than one year are not deductible.101  For this rea-
                                                 
98 This is because a shorter capitalization period would result in a more valuable yearly deduction for the facility 
given the inflation and opportunity costs associated with the time deprivation of using the money presently versus 
using it in the future. 
99 26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (West 2012).  The 150% declining balance method may be computed in 
year one by taking the value of the asset divided by the number of years the asset is to be depreciated (fifteen years) 
then multiplying by 150%.  To compute for year two, subtract the deduction taken in year one from the value of the 
asset, then divide by fifteen and multiply by 150%.  Continue for each subsequent year until the year in which the 
straight-line method would result in a greater deduction.  In that year, switch to the straight-line method and contin-
ue for the remaining years. 
100 Computed as follows: ($36 million) / (15 years) = $2.4 million per year.   
101 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 167 (West 2012).   
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son, Nuclear cannot deduct the cost of the buildings, reactor, fuel rods, or fixtures.  Section 162 
of the Code permits a deduction for “ordinary and necessary expenses” in carrying on any trade 
or business.102  Under § 162 of the Code, business expenses may be deducted where the benefit 
of the payment is realized within the current taxable year. 103 To qualify as a business expense, 
the outlay must be “ordinary and necessary.”104  Whether an expense is “ordinary” depends on 
the duration of the benefit.  If the taxpayer realizes the benefit within the year the expenditure is 
made, it is very likely to be a deductible expense pursuant to § 162.  The typical example is em-
ployee salary.  Conversely, if the benefit is realized over more than a year, the expenditure must 
be capitalized, i.e., not deducted, pursuant to § 263.  It is important to understand the difference 
between an expenditure that qualifies as a deductible expense and one that must be capital-
ized.105  The significance between deductible and capital expenditures is that an ordinary and 
necessary business expense may be deducted entirely for the year it is incurred, while capital ex-
penditures are depreciated annually based on the useful life of the asset purchased.  The result is 
that capital expenditures are not fully deductible in the year the expense occurs, forcing a loss in 
the time-value of money over the depreciation period.   
The facts and circumstances of the transaction have an important role in distinguishing 
the often fine-line between business expenses and capital expenditures.  For nuclear facilities, the 
most valuable deductible expenses include reactor maintenance expenses and employee sala-
ries.106  In fact, the deductibility of maintenance expenses associated with removing a component 
                                                 
102 Id. § 162(a). 
103  See Stevens v. C.I.R., 388 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that the taxpayer may deduct “recurring expendi-
tures where the benefit derived from the payment is realized and exhausted within the taxable year”).   
104 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a). 
105 In the case of capital expenditures related to depreciable assets, the full value of a capital expense must be incre-
mentally deducted to its salvage value.  Id. § 168(b)(4).  Under favorable depreciation rules the salvage value is $0, 
according to the rules set forth in §§ 167 and 168 of the Code (depreciation sections).   
106 Another valuable deduction may be taken for research and development costs under § 174.  See id. § 174 (permit-
ting a deduction for research and experimentation associated with a trade or business). 
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of the reactor to maintain the status quo of the reactor’s production can be quite complicated.  
Generally, expenses incurred in the removal of a depreciable asset in connection with the instal-
lation of a replacement asset are deductible.107  For instance, when nuclear fuel rods must be re-
placed, the expenses associated with removing the old rods may be deducted rather than capital-
ized into the cost of the new rods.  There remains a slight, yet notable distinction when removing 
the component of a depreciable asset.  In the example above, the nuclear fuel rods constituted 
depreciable assets rather than a component of a depreciable asset, because they had a useful life 
of more than one year.  The deducibility or capitalization of expenses incurred in removing and 
replacing a component of a depreciable asset will depend on whether the replacement constitutes 
a repair or improvement to the depreciable asset.108  If replacement is a repair, the expenses may 
be deducted; conversely, if the replacement amounts to an improvement, the expenses must be 
capitalized and depreciated.   
Nuclear is capable of operating at an average of 93% of its 1000 megawatt nameplate ca-
pacity.  The average yearly expenses are computed from the LCOE estimated above, less the 
costs of the nuclear fuel rods.  This is because the LCOE takes into account the refueling costs 
associated with operating the plant, and other costs characterized as capital expenditures and as-
sociated interest expenses.109  Next, subtract the amount attributable to future decommissioning 
                                                 
107 Rev. Rul. 2000-7, 2000-1 C.B. 712. 
108 See Permanent Plant Closure Not Required for Decommissioning Costs, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 3, 2009), 
2009 TNT 146-20 (LEXIS) (IRS memorandum of March 11, 2009, on nuclear decommissioning costs) (concluding 
that “the costs of removing a component of a depreciable asset are either deductible or capitalizable based on wheth-
er replacement of the component constitutes a repair or an improvement”). 
109 It will not be necessary at this time to subtract the $5 million associated with the purchase of the land because it 
was a capital expenditure included in the loan repayment costs.  However, the value of the land must be removed in 
determining the depreciation value of the plant.   
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expenses.110  The deductible business expenses for Nuclear’s first year of operations would be 
approximately $123.6 million.111   
3. Interest Expenses 
 Section 163 of the Code112 allows a deduction of the interest expenses paid in a trade or 
business on indebtedness.113  Due to the similarity between interest payments and § 162 business 
expenses, business-related interest expenses would be deductible even if § 163 did not exist.  Fi-
nancing a nuclear energy plant often requires a multifaceted credit plan.114  The interest accrued 
during the construction period of the facility must be capitalized into the overall expense of 
building the nuclear facility.115  Once construction is complete and production begins, the tax-
payer may deduct from gross revenue an amount equal to the interest expense incurred in paying 
its liabilities.  For Nuclear, the interest expenses associated with the $5.25 billion loan would 
amount to $309 million in Nuclear’s first year of operations.116   
 
 
                                                 
110 Decommissioning expenses will be discussed below.  For purposes of this example, the applicable amount of fu-
ture decommissioning expenses will total $8.75 million/year.   
111 Computed as follows: First, determine costs by subtracting fuel costs from LCOE (8 cents) – (.85 cents/kWh re-
fueling costs) = 8.15 cents/kWh.  Next determine nameplate hourly output at (1,000 megawatts) x (1,000 kilowatts) 
= (1 million average kilowatt output per hour).  Then determine total yearly output (1 million kilowatts) x (24 
hours/day) x (365 days/year) x (93% average hourly output) = 8.1468 billion kWh’s produced in a year.  Then de-
termine total yearly cost at (8.1468 billion kWh’s) x (8.15 cents/kWh) = $663,964,200.  Then subtract the total costs 
of the loan payments and decommissioning expenses, ($663,964,200) – ($531,629,802 loan payments) – ($8.75 mil-
lion future decommissioning expenses) = $123,584,398 of ordinary and necessary expenditures.   
112 26 U.S.C.A. § 163 (West 2012). 
113 Revenue Ruling 69-188 explains the principle of interest as follows: 
[F]or tax purposes, interest has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States as the 
amount one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money and as the compensation paid for 
the use or forbearance of money . . . . The payment or accrual of interest . . . must be incidental to 
an unconditional and legally enforceable obligation . . . . 
Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54. 
114 Ben-Moshe et al., supra note 34, at 505-06. 
115 26 U.S.C.A. § 263A(a)(2)(B) (West 2012).  See Encyclopedia Britannica v. United States, 685 F.2d 212, 214 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that the payments for acquisition of an asset which would yield income over a period of years 
must be capitalized into the basis of the asset). 
116 Computed using a loan repayment calculator.  Note that the amount of the principal paid in the first year would 
equal $222,687,535 and the total interest would be $308,942,267. 
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4. Decommissioning Expenses 
When a nuclear facility is no longer in service, it must go through the two-step process of 
“decommissioning.”  First, the facility must remove any equipment or materials contaminated 
with radiation, and place spent nuclear fuel rods in dry storage until final disposal.  Second, the 
plant will be disassembled, which may take years to complete.117  Nuclear decommissioning 
costs are defined broadly to include expenses incurred before, during, and after the actual de-
commissioning process.118  More specifically, nuclear decommissioning costs encompass “all 
otherwise deductible expenses to be incurred in connection with the entombment, decontamina-
tion, dismantlement, removal, and disposal of the structures, systems and components of a nucle-
ar power plant” that has permanently ceased the production of electric energy.119  Section 
468A(a) permits a current deduction for the future costs of decommissioning a nuclear power 
plant if the owners of the facility deposit contributions into a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve 
Fund.120  This broadly-reaching tax incentive provides a substantial benefit to nuclear facilities 
facing decommissioning costs as high as $400 million.121 
Section 468A limits the amount of the deduction to the “ruling amount,” which is the 
amount approved by the Secretary to ensure that the costs of decommissioning are covered but 
that no excess deductions are made over the economic useful life of the nuclear power plant.122  
Although costs associated with the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant may generally be 
                                                 
117 See generally Nuclear Waste Disposal:  Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST.  
(Oct. 2010), http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/nuclearwastedisposal/factsheet/ decommission-
ingnuclearpowerplants/?page=1.  The second step may be accomplished by choosing one of three options: (1) “De-
con” (decontamination) disassemble and remove any contaminated parts then ship “to a low-level waste disposal 
site”; (2) “Safstor” (safe storage) safely store any contaminated materials on-site, wait 50 years for radioactive de-
cay, then continue with disassembly; or (3) “Entomb” encase the radioactive structures in concrete and appropriately 
maintain the site until radioactive decay is at safe level.  Id. 
118 See Private Letter Ruling 9638001, 1996 PLR LEXIS 1149. 
119 26 C.F.R. § 1.468A-1(b)(6) (West 2012). 
120 26 U.S.C.A. § 468A(a) (West 2012). 
121 See Nuclear Waste Disposal:  Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 117.   
122 26 U.S.C.A. § 468A(d)(2). 
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deducted, the rules for capitalization remain unaltered.123  Some costs associated with decom-
missioning the plant may qualify as “nuclear decommissioning costs,” but must still be capital-
ized.124   
 For Nuclear, the decommissioning costs will be approximately 10% of the capital costs 
or $525 million, assuming that Nuclear plans to decommission in sixty years and receives ap-
proval by the Secretary to make even yearly contributions to a Nuclear Decommissioning Re-
serve Fund in accordance with § 468A(a).  Therefore, Nuclear will contribute approximately 
$8.75 million to the Decommissioning Fund each year and will be permitted a deduction for the 
same amount.   
5. Depreciation 
 The government taxes net income, leaving the costs incurred in the production of income 
untouched.  To further this goal, Congress created a cost-recovery system known as “deprecia-
tion” which permits a yearly deduction for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of 
certain depreciable assets.125  The cost recovery of capital expenditures used to purchase depre-
ciable property occurs over a certain number of years.  This period is known as the “recovery pe-
riod,” and is based on the asset’s value, class life, and the depreciation method used.126   
 It is necessary to determine the amount of Nuclear’s deduction for each depreciable asset, 
including the power plant itself and the nuclear fuel assemblies, in order to determine its total 
depreciation deduction.  According to IRS Publication No. 946, an electric utility nuclear pro-
                                                 
123 See Private Letter Ruling 9638001, supra note 118.   
124 Id. For instance, expenses incurred in the construction of an independent spent fuel storage building during the 
decommissioning of a nuclear facility must be capitalized even though such expenditures are properly characterized 
as nuclear decommissioning expenses.  
125 Limited to property used in the trade or business, or property held for the production of income.  26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 167(a) (West 2012).   
126 The taxpayer must determine the depreciable asset’s “recovery period,” which is determined from its “class life.”  
The class life is essentially the midpoint of the Asset Depreciation Range.  Id. § 168(e)(1).  See generally Rev. Proc. 
87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674.  
 
24 
duction plant has a class life of twenty years.  However, the IRS grants a beneficial recovery pe-
riod of fifteen years under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System.127  Because the nu-
clear power plant is classified as twenty-year property, it must utilize the 150% declining balance 
method under § 168.128  When Nuclear commences operations on July 31, 2020, the applicable 
convention will be the half-year convention under § 168(d), which treats the property as though 
it were placed in service at the mid-point of the taxable year.129  For Nuclear’s first year of oper-
ation, the depreciation deduction allocable to the power plant would be 5% of its cost or approx-
imately $157 million.130   
                                                 
127  IRS Publication 946, provides that an Electric Utility Nuclear Production Plant has a twenty-year class life and 
fifteen-year recovery period.  The depreciable property “includes assets used in the nuclear power production and 
electricity for sale and related land improvements.” However, it “[d]oes not include nuclear fuel assemblies.”  See 
IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY tbl. B-2, asset class 49.12, at 112 (Publ’n 946, 
2012) [hereinafter HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY], available at: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf (“Elec-
tric Utility Nuclear Production Plant”).  The Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) is the current 
depreciation system added to the Code in 1986.  The MACRS is applicable to tangible property placed in service af-
ter December 31, 1986.  26 C.F.R. § 1.168(a)-1(a) (West 2012). 
128 26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(2)(A) (West 2012).   
129Id. § 168(d)(1), (d)(4)(A).  Under § 168(d)(1) the general rule is to presume the half-year convention on all prop-
erty unless that section of the Code provides otherwise.  Property is considered to be placed in service when it is 
“placed in a condition or state of readiness and availability for a specifically assigned function.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.46-
3(d)(1)(ii) (West 2012).   
130 See Rev. Proc. 87-57, tbl. 1, 1987-2 C.B. 687 (depreciation deduction table). Depreciation deductions must be 
calculated from the aggregate cost of the applicable property that may be properly classified as “Electric Utility Nu-
clear Production Plant.”  For instance, the total capital costs included the construction of an administrative building 
unrelated to the production of electricity cost $30 million.  Likewise, the storage building for spent nuclear fuel to-
taled $40 million.  The costs associated with the purchase of nuclear fuel rods amounted to $207,750,000.  Also, the 
startup expenditures of $36 million and the construction of various parking lots and roads totaled $40 million.  The 
remaining capital costs might also include an operations fund, employee salaries fund, various expense funds, 
maintenance and repair funds, and marketing and advertising campaign funds.  Therefore, for the sake of this exam-
ple, it is necessary to make a presumption on the value of the power plant’s depreciable property.  To do so, assume 
the cost of the nuclear reactor and applicable property totals 60% of the capital costs or $3.15 billion.  Compute the 
depreciation deduction as follows: ($3.15 billion) x (5% year one depreciation with half-year convention) = 
$157,500,000.  In the second year, the amount of depreciation will increase significantly to account for a full taxable 
year.   
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The same analysis is required for each asset listed in the hypothetical.  In the case of the 
administration building, the depreciation deduction would be $738,000.131  For the spent nuclear 
fuel storage building, Nuclear may take a depreciation deduction of $984,400.132  The allocable 
deduction for the initial fuel rods would be $41.5 million.133  If, during the first year of opera-
tions, Nuclear purchases more fuel rods in anticipation of the refueling cycle that will take place 
in its second year of operations, then the fuel assemblies will be deemed “placed in service” in 
the year that Nuclear acquires them.134  Nuclear would properly claim a depreciation deduction 
of $13.9 million.135  The depreciation deduction for the various roads and parking lots would be 
$2 million.136  Therefore, the total depreciation deduction Nuclear could claim for its first year of 
operations would amount to $214.6 million.137   
 
 
                                                 
131 Under 26 U.S.C. § 168(c), nonresidential real property has a recovery period of thirty-nine years.  The applicable 
depreciation method is straight-line depreciation under 26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(3)(A) (West 2012).  Nuclear must use 
the mid-month convention to depreciate the administration building under id. § 168(d)(2)(A).  The instructions to 
IRS Form 4562 provide the depreciation table for thirty-nine-year nonresidential real property placed in service at 
the mid-point of July.  IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR IRS FORM 4562 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i4562.pdf.  The applicable depreciation percentage is 2.461% for year one.  Compute 
the depreciation deduction as follows: ($30 million admin. Building) x (2.461% depreciation deduction) = $738,300 
deduction.   
132 Compute the depreciation deduction as follows: ($40 million storage facility) x (2.461% depreciation deduction) 
= $984,400 deduction.   
133 See generally FLP Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (T.C. 2005) (finding that nuclear 
fuel assemblies have a class life of five years, and referencing Rev. Rul. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 for the same propo-
sition).  See also Rev. Rul. 72-507, 1972-2 C.B. 198 (finding that whether nuclear fuel assembly has a useful life of 
3-5 years is a question of fact).  But see HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY, supra note 127 (specifically providing that 
nuclear fuel assemblies have a class life of five years and a recovery period of five years).  Under 26 U.S.C. § 
168(c), five-year property has a recovery period of five years.  Under 26 U.S.C. § 168(b)(1), the 200% declining 
balance method is used and the applicable convention is the half-year convention under 26 U.S.C. § 168(d)(1).  The 
depreciation deduction percentage is 20% for Nuclear’s first year of operation.  Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 
tbl. 1.  Compute depreciation deduction as follows: ($207.75 million fuel assembly cost) x (20% depreciation deduc-
tion percentage) = $41,550,000.   
134 N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1998).   
135 Compute the depreciation deduction as follows: ($207.75 million) x (33% of the fuel assemblies to be replaced 
after year one) x (20% depreciation percentage) = $13,850,000 depreciation deduction.   
136 The roads and parking lot qualify as land improvements with a twenty-year class life and a fifteen-year recovery 
period. HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY, supra note 127, tbl. B-1, asset class 00.3, at 104 (“Land Improvements”).     
137 Add each computed depreciation deduction for an aggregate deduction of $213,723,900.   
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C.  Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant Pre-Credit Tax Liability 
 Lastly, it is necessary to determine Nuclear’s tax liability based on the corporate tax 
brackets enumerated in the Code.  Nuclear’s gross revenues total over $1.17 billion.138  Once all 
the deductions are taken into account, Nuclear’s taxable income will be approximately $512.4 
million.  At a 35% corporate income tax rate, its pre-credit tax liability will be $179.3 million.139  
The following table summarizes the first-year tax liability for Nuclear: 
 
III. Current Nuclear-Specific Tax Incentives 
A.  Energy Policy Act of 2005- Tax Incentives 
Congress enacted the EPA-2005 with the intent to encourage the future development of 
and investment in alternative production sources of electricity in the United States.140  Nuclear 
energy provides a compelling option in fulfilling this goal.  Of significant benefit, is nuclear 
                                                 
138 Computed as follows: (1000 megawatt nameplate capacity) x (1000 kilowatts/megawatt) x (24 hours/day) x (365 
days/year) x (93% output average) x (14.37 cents/kWh produced and sold) =  $1,170,695,160.   
139 $513,294,595 taxable revenues and $179,653,108.30 total pre-credit tax liability.   
140 See Nuclear Energy Institute Submits Comments on Nuclear Power Production Credit, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 
30, 2006), 2006 TNT 61-19 (LEXIS) (letter from Richard J. Myers to John Parcell, dated January 18, 2006). 
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power's potential to help meet growing energy needs while “emit[ting] no environmentally det-
rimental fumes” traditionally associated with coal and natural gas.141  The production costs for 
nuclear power have continued to decline, dropping to an average of 1.76 cents per kWh in 
2007,142 while the costs associated with licensing, financing, building, and operating modern nu-
clear facilities have continued to rise, and pose a formidable impediment to the expansion of nu-
clear power.143  Although it was once believed that nuclear power would be “too cheap to me-
ter,”144 the capital costs of building a modern nuclear plant are much higher than those for coal 
or natural gas.145   
B.  Production Tax Credit for Advanced Nuclear Power Facilities 
 The EPA-2005 provided much needed help for investors, by authorizing a production tax 
credit for advanced nuclear facilities for their first eight years of operation.146  On August 8, 
2005, the EPA-2005 added § 45J, the Credit for Production from Advanced Nuclear Power Fa-
cilities, to the Internal Revenue Code.  The credit was designed to facilitate commercial interest 
in building advanced nuclear power plants before the year 2021.  The section provides modern 
nuclear energy plants with a production credit of up to 1.8 cents per kWh, for electricity pro-
duced by the taxpayer and sold to an unrelated party147 during the first eight years of the facili-
ty’s operation.148  To qualify as an “advanced nuclear facility,” the NRC must approve the reac-
tor design after December 31, 1993.149  In addition, the facility must also be owned by the tax-
                                                 
141 See Savino, supra note 7. 
142 Id.  
143 See ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., supra note 84, at 38.   
144 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 8 (1987). 
145 See Savino, supra note 7. 
146 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.   
147 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(a)(2)(B) (West 2012). 
148 Id. § 45J(a)(2)(A). 
149 Id. § 45J(d)(2). 
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payer, utilize nuclear energy to produce electricity, and be placed in service after August 8, 2005, 
but before January 1, 2021.150   
The amount of the credit is limited to $125 million per 1000 megawatt capacity.  There is 
also a “national limitation” allocated on a pro rata basis after determining each reactor’s portion 
of the 6000 megawatt national nameplate capacity.151  The value of the credit will therefore not 
exceed $750 million per year with a maximum net value not exceeding $6 billion dollars over 
eight years.152  Although the credit appears enticing, Congress has substantially limited its poten-
tial scope and value in five ways: (1) an application cutoff date for qualification; (2) the “national 
limitation;” (3) an annual credit amount; (4) a phaseout limitation; and (5) no adjustment for in-
flation for the value of the credit.153  Each limitation will be discussed in turn.   
C.  Limitations 
1. COL Application Cutoff Date for Qualified Facilities 
 The taxpayer must submit an application for a construction and operating license (COL) 
with the NRC no later than December 31, 2008, to qualify for the tax credit.154  Construction of 
the facility must begin before January 1, 2014.155  Construction “begins” for purposes of the 
credit when the taxpayer “initiates the pouring of safety-related concrete for the reactor build-
ing.”156  With December 31, 2008, as the cutoff date, no new applications qualify for the § 45J 
credit.  By the end of 2008, the NRC had received sixteen applications proposing a total of twen-
                                                 
150 Id. § 45J(d)(1)(A),  (B). 
151 Id. § 45J(b).  The credit will be reduced further by each facility’s proportion of the aggregate nameplate capacity 
of all qualifying facilities.  That percentage is used to reduce the 6000 megawatt limitation to each facility.  Id.   
152 Computed as follows: First, ($125 million x 6) = $750 million.  Second, ($750 million x 8) = $6 billion. 
153 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2), (d)(1)(B). 
154 Although IRS Notice 2006-40 provides a cutoff date of December 31, 2007, the Service later determined the final 
date to be December 31, 2008.  I.R.S. Notice 2006-1 C.B. 855, § 3.01(1).  See Savino, supra note 7, at n. 46 (“Ac-
cording to Tax Notes, although the notice as released specifies a December 31, 2007, deadline for filing a COL ap-
plication, ‘[a]ccording to the IRS, the correct date . . . is December 31, 2008’”) (citing IRS Issues Interim Guidance 
for Nuclear Power Production Credit, TAX NOTES DAILY (Apr. 12, 2006), 2006 TNT 70-6 (LEXIS)). 
155 Credit for Production from Advanced Nuclear Facilities, I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, 2006-1 C.B. 855, § 3.01(2) 
[hereinafter I.R.S. Notice 2006-40], available at 2006 WL 924985.   
156 Id.  
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ty-four nuclear units.157  Since January 1, 2009, only one application was submitted and accepted 
by the NRC.158  Three more are expected in 2012; however, none of these post-2008 applicants 
will qualify for the credit.159  It is apparent that interest in building new reactors dropped signifi-
cantly after the December 31, 2008, cutoff date.  That only one new application has been filed 
since 2008 lends support to the proposition that investors will generally refuse to go forward 
with construction unless a credit is available.  If Congress were to remove the cutoff date, it 
would allow new applicants to qualify for the credit, and increase interest in building new reac-
tors.   
2. The National Limitation 
Section 45J imposes a “national limitation” of 6000 megawatts, as determined from the 
aggregate nameplate capacities of all qualifying facilities.160  The national limitation restricts the 
maximum amount of kilowatt-hours from which the 1.8 cent credit shall be computed.161  The 
limitation determines each facility’s proportion of the aggregate nameplate capacity162 that bears 
the same ratio to 6000 megawatts.163  The Service determined that if the sum of the “nameplate 
capacity[ies] of all qualifying facilities . . . does not exceed the national megawatt capacity limi-
tation, [then] each of those facilities will be allocated” its actual nameplate capacity.164  If a total 
of six (6) qualifying facilities have an aggregate nameplate capacity of 6000 megawatts (1000 
actual megawatts for each separate facility), then each facility would be allocated its actual 
nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts.  However, if their aggregate nameplate capacity exceeds 
                                                 
157 See Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications, supra note 35. 
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b)(2) (West 2012). 
161 Id. § 45J(b).  
162 The sum of all other qualifying facilities’ nameplate capacities.   
163 The Secretary determines the manner in which to allocate the national megawatt capacity limitation among quali-
fying facilities.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b). 
164 I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155, § 3.03(1). 
 
30 
the national limit, IRS Notice 2006-40 provides that the 6000 megawatt capacity will be allocat-
ed in proportion to each facility’s nameplate capacity.165   
The following example illustrates the national limitation’s application.  If a total of twen-
ty-six nuclear facilities combined for an aggregate nameplate capacity of 26,000 megawatts, with 
each facility having an actual nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts, then each facility’s allocat-
ed capacity under § 45J(b)(2) would be approximately 230.769 megawatts.166 The practical ef-
fect is that a facility capable of operating at a maximum output of 1000 megawatts per hour can 
only take advantage of the production tax credit as if it were operating at 230 megawatts/hour, 
resulting in a significant reduction of the credit’s potential value for that facility.  If Nuclear was 
among those twenty-six facilities, it too would be treated as having an adjusted nameplate capac-
ity of just 230.769 megawatts.   
3. Annual Limitation of Credit Amount 
The annual credit limitation reduces the net value of the credit to each taxpayer.  It is per-
haps the most confusing limitation of § 45J, because the statute itself cannot be given effect 
without the use of the Secretary’s formulated allocation-regulations, found in IRS Notice 2006-
40.  The statute provides that the annual limit of the credit shall not exceed the “amount which 
bears the same ratio to $125 [million] as . . . [the allocated] capacity limitation . . . bears to 
1,000.”167  It is instructive to look at the Secretary’s formulated approach to determine how to 
compute the annual limitation.168  First, compute the “tentative credit” by multiplying 1.8 cents 
                                                 
165 Id. § 3.03(2). 
166 The formula for allocated capacity is [(reactor nameplate capacity) / (aggregate nameplate capacity)] x (6,000 
megawatts).  In the example, the allocated nameplate capacity would be computed as follows: [(1,500 megawatt ac-
tual nameplate capacity of individual facility) / (39,000 megawatt aggregate nameplate capacity)] x (6,000 megawatt 
national limitation).   
167 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(c)(1), (2). 
168 See I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155, § 2.04(1)-(3).     
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“by the kilowatt hours of qualified electricity produced” and sold to an unrelated person.169 Sec-
ond, compute the “credit percentage” of the facility by dividing the allocated capacity of the fa-
cility by that facility’s actual nameplate capacity.170  If the aggregate nameplate capacity of all 
facilities is less than or equal to the national limitation, then that facility’s credit percentage will 
be 100%.171  Finally, the credit allowed will be the lesser of (1) the tentative credit multiplied by 
the credit percentage; or (2) $125 million per 1000 megawatts allocated to the facility. This ap-
proach can ultimately be distilled into two formulas: (1) the Maximum Annual Credit Limitation, 
computed as follows: an amount not more than, ($125 million) x [(individual facility’s allocated 
megawatt capacity limitation) / (1,000)]; (2) Credit Allocation, computed as follows: a combina-
tion of the credit percentage and the tentative credit provisions of Notice 2006-40, [(6,000 meg-
awatt national limitation) / (aggregate nameplate capacity of all facilities)] x 1.8 cents per kWh.   
Continuing with the prior example, the twenty-six facilities each operate at a nameplate 
capacity of 1000 megawatts and receive a 230.769 megawatt capacity allocation.172  Each facility 
in the example would be permitted a 0.41538 cent credit for every kWh hour produced and sold 
to an unrelated person, not to exceed $28.5 million per year for their first eight years of opera-
tion.173  This amount is significantly lower than the value of the credit without such limita-
tions.174  Nuclear would take a credit of .41538 cents/kWh of electricity produced and sold, not 
                                                 
169 Id. § 2.04(1). 
170 Id. § 2.04(2).  
171 See id. § 2.04(2), 3.03(1).   
172 Computed from the National Megawatt Limitation formula.   
173  Each facility’s annual credit allocation is determined as follows: [(6,000 national limitation) / (39,000 aggregate 
nameplate capacities)] x 1.8 cents per kWh, or 0.2769 cents per kWh.  The maximum annual credit amount is com-
puted as follows: ($125 million) x [(230.769 individual allocated capacity) / (1,000)], or $28.85 million. 
174  Had the limitations not applied, the facility would receive a credit in the amount of 1.8 cents per kWh produced 
and sold, up to $187.5 million per year ($125 million x 1.5). 
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to exceed a maximum of $28.5 million per year.  As a result, Nuclear’s credit for its first year of 
operations would be limited to a maximum of $28.5 million, despite totaling $33.8 million.175 
4. Phaseout Limitation 
Section 45J provides a reference price phaseout of the credit that effectively reduces the 
amount of the credit by the excess of the actual price at which the electricity is sold over the ref-
erence price determined by the Code.  The phaseout limitation can be computed as a reduction of 
the credit by one-third of the excess that the “reference price” exceeds eight (8) cents, adjusted 
for inflation.176  The “reference price” is defined as “the annual average contract price per kilo-
watt hour of electricity generated . . . and sold.”177  As of 2010, the eight-cent threshold price 
was indexed at 1.4342, or 11.474 cents.178  The § 45J phaseout limitation initially appears to 
pose little risk of reducing the amount of the credit because the threshold price as inflated for 
2010 exceeds the average cost of nuclear energy.179  The 2010 average retail price for electricity 
was 9.83 cents per kWh, about 1.6 cents below the indexed threshold amount.180   
While these figures are favorable, it bears emphasizing that not one of the 104 nuclear fa-
cilities currently operating in the U.S. qualifies for the § 45J production tax credit because each 
                                                 
175 Computed as follows: (8.1468 billion kilowatts produced in year 1) x (.41538 cents/kWh) = $33,840,553.85 total 
credit for year 1.   
176 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(c)(2) (West 2012). 
177 Id. § 45(e)(2)(C).   
178 FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2D, FTC ¶ L-17762 (RIA 2012), available at 1997 WL 554216 (“The Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) Inflation Adjustment Factor for the Electricity Production Credit Rate and Threshold Price”); 
see also Credit for Renewable Electricity Production, Refined Coal Production, and Indian Coal Production, and 
Publication of Inflation Adjustment Factors and Reference Prices for Calendar Year 2010, I.R.S. Notice 2010-37, 
2010-18 I.R.B. 654, available at 2010 WL 1738863 (providing the inflation adjustment for 2010 at 1.4342 factor).  
Indexed Reference Price computed as follows: (1.4342) x ($0.08) = 11.474 cents.   
179 According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, “the average production cost of” nuclear energy was 2.19 cents per 
kWh in 2010.  Affordable Energy to Support Economic Growth, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST.,  
http://nei.org/keyissues/reliableandaffordableenergy/economicgrowth/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  Similarly, the 
Energy Information Administration reveals the 2010 average cost of nuclear energy was about 2.398 cents per kWh.  
Comparatively, this is about 33% cheaper than coal and 50% cheaper than gas. Electric Power Annual 2010 Data 
Table 8.2, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2011), available at http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/ 
pdf/table8.2.pdf.   
180 Electric Power Annual 2010 Data Table 7.4, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/pdf/table7.4.pdf.   
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was placed in service before the earliest period allowed by the EPA-2005.181  It is futile to use 
operating costs and sales from non-qualifying nuclear facilities currently producing electricity to 
analyze the potential pitfalls of the phaseout limitation because the costs and revenues of the first 
qualifying facility will likely be substantially higher.  Instead, it is necessary to predict the infla-
tion factor based on when the first new facility is likely to begin operations.  The most conserva-
tive date for the inflation estimate would be January 1, 2021.182  In 2021, the inflation factor can 
be approximated by increasing the 2011 inflation factor by the preceding ten-year average in-
crease, resulting in an inflation factor of 1.7959.  This will increase the eight-cent threshold 
amount to 14.37 cents per kWh,183 which may preclude a new nuclear facility from taking full 
advantage of the production tax credit for that year, depending on projected costs and reve-
nues.184  If the indexed threshold price will be less than the projected average price per kWh, 
there is an increased likelihood that § 45J(c)(2) would reduce or phase out the credit.185  For Nu-
clear, this consideration would not be an issue, since it will charge 14.37 cents/kWh to its cus-





                                                 
181 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(d)(2) (West 2012) (requiring that a qualified nuclear facility must use a reactor design 
“approved after December 31, 1993” by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); see also id. § 45J(d)(1)(B) (requiring 
the facility to be placed in service after August 8, 2005, but before January 1, 2021).   
182 See id. § 45J(d)(1)(B) (requiring the facility to be placed in service before January 1, 2021). 
183 From 2001 to 2011 the inflation factor increased approximately 24.21% from a factor of 1.1641 to 1.4459. FED-
ERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2D, supra note 178, FTC ¶ L-17762.   
184 Investors should first estimate the indexed threshold amount for the year in which they plan to begin operations; 
then estimate their projected operating costs of the facility in that year; finally, estimate the projected average price 
per kWh adjusted for inflation and future demand. 
185 Similarly, if the indexed threshold amount is greater than the estimated average price per kWh, which in turn is 
greater than the estimated operating costs per kWh, then the phaseout limitation is less likely to reduce or preclude 
the amount of the credit. 
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5. No Adjustment of Credit Amount for Inflation 
 Unlike other energy credits, the amount of 1.8 cent per kWh credit for advanced nuclear 
facilities cannot be adjusted for inflation.186  Its value will ultimately reduce for each subsequent 
year.  If a modern facility were to complete construction and commence operations by the year 
2021, it must take the value of the credit in 2005 year dollars.  The kWh production credit will be 
worth much less than it would have been if the amount were adjusted for inflation to mirror its 
value in 2021 dollars.187   
Nuclear would generate a production tax credit in its first year of operations totaling 
$28.5 million, and thereby reduce its tax liability to $150.8 million.188  Now compare the same 
facts adjusted for inflation. Had the credit amount and limitations been adjusted by the inflation 
factor the values would have been much larger.  Using the estimated inflation factor for 2021 of 
1.7959 above, the credit should be 3.23 cents/kWh (instead of 1.8 cents/kWh), with a maximum 
credit limitation of $224,487,500 per 1000 megawatts of nameplate capacity.  Under those cir-
cumstances, Nuclear would earn the credit at .74538 cents/kWh189 with a maximum credit allo-
cation of $51.8 million.190  Nuclear would generate a total credit of $60.7 million,191 limited to 
the adjusted $51.8 million maximum credit allocation for its first year of operations.  Nuclear’s 
tax liability would be reduced to $127.5 million, lower than its tax liability of $150.8 million 
                                                 
186 Although § 45J lacks any provision to increase the rate of the credit by the inflation factor for the given taxable 
year, a similar credit for electricity produced from certain renewable resources found in § 45 is adjusted for infla-
tion.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(b)(2) (allowing for inflation adjustment on limitation amount of credit for electricity 
produced from certain renewable sources).   
187 Considering the high cost of building the plant, a modern facility must charge a sufficient amount to its customers 
in order to cover its liabilities and expenses, and yet, turn a profit.  The cost of electricity to consumers will logically 
increase over the years alongside inflation, resulting in larger revenues to utility providers.   
188 Computed as follows: ($179,338,528.25 pre-credit tax liability) – ($28.5 million production tax credit) = 
$150,838,528.25 in total tax liability.   
189 Computed as follows: [(6,000 megawatt national limitation)/(26,000 megawatt aggregate nameplate capacity)] x 
(3.23 cents/kWh adjusted for inflation) = .74538 cents/kWh.   
190 Computed as follows: ($224,487,500 adjusted credit allocation) x [(230.769 allocated nameplate capacity) / 
(1,000 megawatts)] = $51,804,755.89 adjusted maximum credit allocation.   
191 Computed as follows: (8.1468 billion kilowatts produced in year 1) x (.74538 cents/kWh adjusted for inflation) = 
$60,724,617.84 total credit generated for year 1. 
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when the credit is not adjusted for inflation.192  With each subsequent year after 2005,193 the po-
tential value of the credit ultimately decreases because it is not adjusted for inflation.   
D.  Coordination of § 45J with the General Business Credit 
 The built-in limitations of § 45J, illustrated above, are not the only hurdles the taxpayer 
must clear in claiming the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facilities.  After determin-
ing the amount of the § 45J tax credit, companies exercising the option must claim the credit pur-
suant to the provisions of the General Business Credit under I.R.C. § 38,194 which further limits 
the extent of the § 45J credit.195   
Congress permits business and profit-seeking taxpayers to utilize various credits as an in-
centive to encourage national economic expansion and development.196  The taxpayer must 
claim certain credits within the limits of § 38 of the Internal Revenue Code.197  Section 38 per-
mits application of a “general business credit” for the current taxable year.198  The amount of the 
general business credit includes, inter alia, “the advanced nuclear power facility production cred-
it determined under § 45J(a).”199  Section 38 limits the aggregate allowance of the general busi-
ness credit to the excess “of the taxpayers’ ‘net tax liability’ for the year, less the greater of the 
‘tentative minimum tax’ or 25 percent of ‘net regular tax liability’ in excess of $25,000.”200  The 
                                                 
192 Computed as follows: ($179,338,528.25 pre-credit tax liability) – ($51,804,755.89 adjusted maximum credit al-
location) = $127,533,772.36 in tax liability.   
193 The year Congress added § 45J to the code.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.   
194 26 U.S.C.A. § 38 (West 2012) (General Business Credit).   
195 See infra note 201. 
196 See World Airways, Inc. v. C.I.R., 564 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the investment credit used to mod-
ernize and expand nation’s production capabilities).   
197 26 U.S.C.A. § 38. 
198 Id. § 38(a). 
199 Id. § 38(b)(21).   
200 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND  GIFTS ¶ 27.1.2 (2011) 
(“Business Credits-In General”).  For a better understanding of the General Business Credit and how it works to 
prevent excessive reduction of income for tax reporting purposes, see generally Id. ¶ 27.1.  The exact details of in-




taxpayer should be aware that § 38 may create latent problems related to the amount of the § 45J 
credit claimed.201  
Section 45J allocates a production tax credit based on the energy output of a modern nu-
clear facility.  It follows that the value of the credit increases as the facility produces more elec-
tricity.  At the same time, more electricity produced and sold to customers results in larger reve-
nues; as those revenues increase, so too will the taxpayer’s overall tax liability.  Since the effect 
of the § 45J credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the taxpayer’s tax liability, the credit will be 
claimed against a portion of the taxpayer’s net taxes owed to the government for that year.  Sec-
ond, note that the limitations imposed by § 38(c), the general business credit, are essentially 
based on percentages relating to taxable income—the “tentative minimum tax” and the “net reg-
ular tax liability.”202  Though a nuclear facility may produce enough electricity to reap the bene-
fit of a large production tax credit, the percentage-based limitation of the general business credit 
may result in disallowance of a portion of that credit for any eligible § 45J-year.203  However, 
under current law this may not be the case.   
There are sixteen completed § 45J-eligible applications for COLs proposing the construc-
tion of twenty-four modern nuclear facilities by 2021.  If all applicants successfully complete 
                                                 
201 The general business credit’s limitation of allowance references the “tentative minimum tax.”  Id. § 38(c).  The 
tentative minimum tax is 20% of the alternative minimum taxable income “as exceeds the exemption amount” of 
$40,000. 26 U.S.C.A. § 55(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2012).  This provision prevents the § 45J credit from offsetting any 
amount calculated for the tentative minimum tax in the event that the taxpayers actual tax liability falls so low that 
the taxpayer is forced to pay the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).  Likewise, commentators note that if the tenta-
tive minimum tax for the company owning the nuclear facility is zero, then the maximum amount of the general 
business credit is limited to “the first $25,000 of tax liability [plus] 75 percent of any remaining tax liability.”  
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 200, ¶ 27.1.2. This is a tough break for new nuclear facilities capable of consistent-
ly operating around 90% of their nameplate capacity, even in the first year of operations.   
202 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 38(c)(1); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West 2012) (stating that the tentative minimum tax is 
20% of the alternative minimum taxable income “as exceeds the exemption amount” of $40,000).   
203 Because the limitations of the general business credit reserves a minimum percentage of the net tax liability to go 
untouched by the § 45J credit, § 38 may leave the taxpayer with a significant tax liability that would have otherwise 
been reduced by the unused excess of the general business credit for that year.  This potential problem is latent in 
that there is no real way to determine if the limitation will apply until the taxpayer begins operations.  For instance, 
the tax liability could be large enough that the amount of the § 45J credit claimed fails to exceed the § 38 limitation.  
In that instance, the full value of the § 45J credit will be claimed against the net tax liability. 
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each project, the § 45J credit will be significantly limited for each facility.  It is therefore not 
likely that the amount of the § 45J credit included in the computation of the general business 
credit will exceed the § 38 limitation.  Should Congress decide to amend § 45J, the chances of § 
38 limiting the allowance of the credit will increase.   
The credit is refundable under § 39 of the Code.204  A taxpayer may recapture the amount 
of the credit that exceeds the credit allowance permitted under § 38.  The excess is carried back 
to the preceding taxable year and carried forward twenty years, subject to the same limitations 
under § 38(c) for each taxable year.205  In calculating the general business credit for subsequent 
years, the amount of the carryforward from the preceding year, if any, is applied first.  Then the 
amount of the credit for the current taxable year is determined and applied against the remaining 
tax liability subject to the allowance limitations for “qualified business credits.”206   
Generally, at the end of the twenty year carryforward period any unused portion of the 
excess from the first year the general business credit to which the excess applies was calculated 
in regard to the twenty year carryforward period will apply as a deduction—not a credit—in the 
next taxable year to the extent that the unused excess consists of “qualified business credits” un-
der § 196.207  However, current law does not classify § 45J as a “qualified business credit” for 
this purpose.208  Thus, nuclear facilities that qualify for the nuclear production tax credit have the 
opportunity to benefit from the full amount of the credit by applying the excess to subsequent 
years for twenty years; however, they lose the benefit of a deduction of any expired amount at 
the conclusion of that period.   
E.  Efficacy of § 45J 
                                                 
204 26 U.S.C.A. § 39(a).  
205 Id.    
206 26 U.S.C.A. § 196(a) (West 2012).   
207 Id.  
208 Id. § 196(c).   
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The production tax credit will be too small of an incentive to have any real effect in per-
suading investors to spend significant sums of money to build modern nuclear reactors.  Section 
45J is severely limited on paper as well as in practice.  New facilities are likely to experience 
their highest costs and liabilities in the first few years of operation.  The benefits of the produc-
tion tax credit will neither be significant enough to quell the industry’s concern of a looming 
cloud of bankruptcy, nor substantial enough to assist in the payment of liabilities.   
IV.  Congress Should Change the Tax Structure to More Effectively Promote the Develop-
ment of Modern Nuclear Power 
 
 Since 2009, there has been one application to build a new nuclear power plant.209  Con-
gress could change this and more appropriately give effect to the legislative purpose of the EPA-
2005 by providing tax incentives to expand and develop modern nuclear energy.  Section 45J 
significantly benefits first-movers of modern nuclear energy but is fatally flawed by its limita-
tions.210  Congress and the President legislatively endorsed the clean energy movement by enact-
ing legislation subsidizing production from nuclear—and renewable—sources.  These subsidies 
should be designed with that goal in mind.  Renewable energy sources are far from capable of 
leading the clean air revolution, though not necessarily incapable.  Nuclear energy can help sig-
nificantly reduce carbon and greenhouse gas emissions in the near future, by creating an effec-
tive reduction in carbon-emissions from electricity production during the renewable energy ex-
pansion period.211  A better approach, using different tax incentives, can spark the chain reaction 
necessary to expand nuclear development.   
A.  Congress Should Amend § 45J 
                                                 
209 See Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications, supra note 35.   
210 From 2007-2008, every new application for a nuclear reactor decreased the value of the credit pursuant to the na-
tional megawatt limitation.  See infra Part III.C.2.   
211 Discussed infra Part I.   
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 The industry cannot shoulder the potential burdens and risks associated with building, 
operating, and dismantling a modern nuclear power plant.  Historically, construction costs ex-
ceed their projected figures.212  Section 45J started off as an extremely valuable tax incentive but 
because of its built-in limitations, every investor suffered as more interest in new plants grew.  
These limitations inherently pit industry leaders against one another and deter future investment 
by limiting the value of the credit for every new COL application received.  The credit is unpre-
dictable and limited to first-mover participation.  Congress should amend § 45J to allow each 
new investor to take advantage of the full value of the credit.   
B.  Remove the Application Cutoff Date 
Although, investors do not want to continue “with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over 
[their] head,”213 the bulk of federal support needed to go forward is no longer available to new 
applicants.  Current applicants face a Hobson’s choice of either continuing with construction 
knowing the value of the credit is a fraction of what it could have been, or ceasing all efforts and 
losing the potential business opportunity.  Therefore, Congress should remove the cutoff date for 
eligibility under § 45J.  This would allow new investors to enter the market and take advantage 
of the production tax credit.  Likewise, removing the cutoff date would fulfill the legislative pur-
pose of clean energy tax credits, by increasing the amount of modern nuclear energy facilities, 
and reducing the creation of new coal and natural gas operated facilities.  This would ultimately 
decrease the overall environmental impact of energy production.  If Congress refuses to amend 
the cutoff date, there will likely be no significant development of nuclear energy because future 
applicants will not be eligible for the credit’s much needed subsidy.   
C.  Amend the National Megawatt Limitation 
                                                 
212 See DEUTCH ET AL., supra note 79, at 8. 
213 Tomain, supra note 10.     
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Removing the cutoff date would be the first step of many to make the credit a favorable 
tax subsidy to future investors.  However, under current law, if Congress were to permit new ap-
plicants to become eligible for the credit, the applicant pool would increase, causing the credit al-
location to decrease for all other applicants.214  It would also be necessary to contemporaneously 
alter the national megawatt limitation to prevent a significant reduction of the credit available to 
other applicants.   
When Congress added § 45J to the Code, it intended to spend a maximum of $6 billion 
and wanted to ensure that no matter how many applicants filed for COL, the credit would never 
exceed this predetermined amount.215  Recall that each qualifying facility may only claim the 
credit for the first eight (8) years of operations.216  Congress should remove the national mega-
watt limitation and instead reduce the credit based on each separate facility.  This could be ac-
complished by providing that each facility will be permitted a maximum credit of $100 million 
per year adjusted by the ratio which the reactor’s nameplate capacity bears to 1500 megawatts 
for its first eight years of operations.  A nuclear power plant with a 1000 megawatt nameplate 
capacity is eligible for a maximum yearly credit of $66.7 million and a 1500 megawatt reactor 
would qualify for the full $100 million credit.  This approach benefits investors by allowing them 
to know the amount of the credit before commencing operations.  Similarly, investors could be 
sure that, as new applicants enter the market, the credit will not gradually lose its value.   
D. Adjust the Credit Amount for Inflation 
 Congress added the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facilities to the Code in 
2005.  The amount of the credit contemplated at that time was subject to the value of the dollar in 
                                                 
214 The National Megawatt Limitation under § 45J reduces the credit allocation based on the aggregate nameplate 
capacity of all other applicants.  26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b) (West 2012).   
215 See Overview of § 45J, supra Part III.B.  
216 See id.  
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2005.  However, no adjustment for inflation is permitted for the 1.8 cent credit amount or maxi-
mum credit allowance.  It can take years for a nuclear facility to complete the application, con-
struction, and inspection phases before commencing operations.  In fact, Congress anticipated 
this delay by requiring that the nuclear power plant begin construction before January 1, 2014.217  
If a modern nuclear facility commences operations before January 1, 2021, over fourteen years 
after § 45J was added to the Code, it will take the value of the credit without the benefit of any 
adjustment for inflation or, more fundamentally, it will take the value of the credit subject to the 
value of the dollar in 2005.  Congress should permit inflation adjustments to the credit amount 
and maximum credit allowance to ensure an equitable value of the credit each year a taxpayer 
claims it.  Doing so allows investors to make an inflation adjustment to the eight-cent value of 
the credit for every eligible year, thereby reducing any inherent loss in the time-value of the 
credit.    
E.  Offer Non-Credit Tax Incentives 
 One beneficial tax incentive to modern nuclear power plants is the ability to deduct the 
future costs of decommissioning the plant under § 468A.218  Congress should consider offering 
other non-credit tax incentives such as a reduction of the tax rate for income from operations for 
a limited number of years after the nuclear power plant is placed in service.  Most large electrical 
utility companies will generate revenues in excess of $10 million, the minimum threshold for 
imposition of the 35% tax rate on corporations.219  Congress could reduce the tax rate for ad-
                                                 
217  I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155.  Note that the nuclear power plant must also be placed in service after 
August 8, 2005, but before January 1, 2021.  26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(d)(1)(B).   
218 26 U.S.C.A. § 468A (West 2012).   
219 26 U.S.C.A. § 11(b)(1)(D) (West 2012).  
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vanced nuclear power plants to the next lower threshold of 34%220 for the duration of time the 
facility qualifies to take the production tax credit.   
Conversely, Congress could elect to replace the § 45J credit altogether, and instead re-
duce the corporate tax rate for a limited period of time to each qualifying facility.  For instance, 
for the first eight years of operations, an advanced nuclear power plant would be taxed at a 25% 
rate.  The benefit to investors would be the existence of a simple method of computing their tax 
liability by applying the reduced percentage in lieu of making the complex calculations of the § 
45J credit amount.  More significantly, a reduced tax rate would not pit the IRS and nuclear 
power plants against each other.  This is because a credit reduces the amount of tax the IRS re-
ceives based on the amount of electricity produced.  As a result, the more revenue a nuclear plant 
earns, the less tax it will pay under the credit systems approach.  In contrast, a reduced tax rate 
places the business interests of the nuclear power plant in line with the tax-revenue interests of 
the IRS.  Thus, as a nuclear power plant produces more revenue, its tax liability continues to in-
crease, which ultimately confers a benefit on both the IRS and the nuclear power plant because 
each will earn more income based on the performance of the plant.  Since the reduced tax rate 
would be limited in duration to eight years, normal corporate rates will eventually apply.   
V. Conclusion 
 The increasing demand for electricity in the U.S. will require the construction of new en-
ergy plants.  Because of their price competitiveness, coal and natural gas power plants are more 
likely to be built unless Congress creates effective incentives for investors to build nuclear power 
plants.  As new coal and natural gas plants are built, the environment suffers an increase in car-
bon emissions released into the atmosphere, and more non-renewable natural resources are de-
pleted.  Nuclear energy is a safe, clean, and effective alternative.  Renewable resource production 
                                                 
220 Id. § 11(b)(1)(C).   
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of electricity is far from capable of matching the output of coal and natural gas anytime in the 
near future.  Nuclear energy can help to displace these more damaging alternatives in the near fu-
ture while renewable energy continues to develop.  The EPA-2005 provides a significant step in 
the right direction and evidences Congress’ willingness to subsidize nuclear energy.  Unfortu-
nately, the tax incentives created by the EPA-2005 are nominal and ineffective.  Congress should 
amend § 45J to provide a realistic tax subsidy for nuclear energy or amend its approach altogeth-
er.  With the right incentives, nuclear energy can develop and expand enough to significantly re-
duce carbon and greenhouse gas emissions while meeting the growing demand for electricity.  
Without such subsidies, nuclear power cannot survive.   
